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IN THE UTAH COURT.OF APPEALS 
SHERMAN L. RICHENS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
FRED SCHWENDIMAN, Director of 
Drivers License Services, State 
of Utah, 
Defendant/Respondent, 
Case No. 900041-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2a~3 (2)(a). This is an appeal from an 
order of the Eighth Judicial District Court denying 
plaintiff's petition for review and revoking plaintiff's 
driving privileges. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the standard admonitions given as a notice and 
warning of the consequences of a refusal to comply with an 
arresting officer's request to submit to a chemical test to 
determine blood alcohol levels constitutes adequate notice 
under the due process clauses of the United States and Utah 
Constitution. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Statutory Appendix 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
1. On or about May 5# 1989, petitioner Sherman 
Richens was arrested for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. 
2. The petitioner was transported to the Duchesne 
County Jail where the officer requested that the petitioner 
submit to a chemical test of his blood as per the Uniform DUI 
Citation form. (R.10) 
3. The officer specifically requested that the 
petitioner submit to a breath test. (R.10) (Uniform DUI 
Citation attached hereto as Exhibit "A") 
4. Petitioner replied that he would take a blood 
test. (R.10) 
5. The officer then read the second admonition of the 
Uniform DUI Citation. (R.ll) 
6. The petitioner again stated he would only submit 
to a blood test. (R.ll) 
7. At no time did the officer tell the petitioner 
that pursuant to §41-6-44.10 the arresting officer had the 
sole exclusive prerogative to determine which chemical test 
the petitioner had to take. (R.14-15) 
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8. A witness called by the Department, Mrs. Harrison, 
testified that she saw the petitioner at the jail. Petitioner 
stated that he felt his license would not be taken unless he 
was found guilty. (R.20) 
9. The petitioner's license was revoked for one year 
commencing June 6, 1990. 
10. The matter came for the the Eighth Judicial 
District Court of Duchesne County, the Honorable Dennis L. 
Draney, presiding. 
11. The court issued its Findings of Pact and 
Conclusions of law on August 28, 1989. 
12. Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on November 
15, 1989. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The present standard warning given to a motorist after 
a peace officer's request for the motorist to submit to tests 
for blood alcohol levels does not express the actual 
consequences of the motorist's refusal to submit to the test. 
The present standard warning states that the motorist's 
license "can be revoked." Actually, the division is required 
to revoke the motorist's license. Because the warning is 
given in discretionary, rather than in mandatory terms, the 
motorist is not given adequate notice of the consequences of 
his or her irrevocable decision to refuse the requested test. 
-3-
The inaccuracy of the warning is a violation of due 
process required by the federal and state constitutions. The 
dissimilar warnings required by the commercial drivers license 
statute and the general implied consent statute is a violation 
of the uniform operation clause of the Utah Constitution. 
Therefore, the revocation of appellant's license 
should be reversed and the standard required warning of the 
consequences of a motorist's refusal to submit to a proper 
request by a peace officer for a blood alcohol test should be 
declared unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH 
CONSTITUTIONS REQUIRES THAT A MOTORIST RECEIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE 
OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING A CHEMICAL TEST BEFORE THE 
DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION MAY REVOKE THE MOTORIST'S LICENSE FOR 
A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR. 
Notice is a requirement of Due Process under the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. The Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution provides that "No person shall 
be . . . deprived of life# liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . ..." The Utah Constitution, Article 1, §7 
also provides that "No personal shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law." 
Unlike the federal constitutional protection of due 
process, listed among the rights of those accused of criminal 
acts, the Utah constitutional due process clause is listed 
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apart from the rights of the accused which rights are listed 
in Article I, §12. Thus the state due process protection is 
without reservation applicable to the civil nature of the 
dispute before this Court. 
Effective notice is an important component of due 
process and requires that a clear explanation of the choices 
and consequences facing the citizen is provided in order for 
the citizen to make an informed decision. A presumed drunk is 
as entitled to clear notice as anyone, and more in need of it. 
Notice and due process in the context of the present 
case requires notice sufficient to explain the actual 
consequences of a motorist's refusal to submit to a blood 
alcohol test and to afford an intelligent decision based on 
those consequences. The consequence or refusal is not a mere 
possibility of revocation, it is a certainty of revocation. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Jacobson, 669 
P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983), affirmed the classic definition 
of adequate notice set forth in Mullane v. Hanover Trust, 339 
U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950): 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency of 
the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections. The notice must be of 
such a nature as reasonably to convey the 
required information .... 
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Moreover, as stated in Article I, §27 of the Utah 
Constitution, "Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles 
is essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government." In the present case, the 
fundamental principle of adequate notice ought to be a part of 
the warning meant to inform the motorist of the consequences 
of a refusal to submit to the requested test. 
Although that definition of adequate notice is given 
in the context of notice for civil trials, the requirements of 
adequate notice set forth are applicable in the present case. 
Those requirements are that notice should be a reasonable 
explanation of the circumstances designed to convey the 
required information. The motorist's refusal to submit to a 
test is a proceeding accorded finality in the sense that the 
motorist is not given a second chance to submit to refuse a 
test. Unless the motorist immediately agrees to the test 
after this vague and misleading warning, " . . . no test may 
be given." U.C.A. §41-6-44.10(2)(a). The information 
required to make an informed decision is that the motorist's 
driving privileges shall be suspended unless he or she submits 
to the test. 
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A* The implied consent statute requires the Drivers 
License Division to revoke the license of any individual who 
refuses to submit to a blood alcohol test. 
Utah Code Annotated, §41-6-44.10 (2) provides in part 
that: 
(2)(a) If the person has been placed under 
arrest# and has then been requested by a peace 
officer to submit to any one or more of the 
chemical tests under Subsection (1), and refuses 
to submit to the chemical test of any one or all 
of the tests requested, the person shall be 
warned by a peace officer requesting the test or 
tests that a refusal to submit to the test or 
tests can result in revocation of his license to 
operate a motor vehicle. Following this 
warning, unless the person immediately requests 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a 
peace officer be administered, no test may be 
given. A peace officer shall serve on the 
person, on behalf of the division, immediate 
notice of the division's intention to revoke the 
person's privilege or license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
The required warning is designed to notify the 
motorist of the consequences of a refusal to submit to a blood 
alcohol test requested by a peace officer. The statute is 
constitutionally flawed because it only requires that the 
warning be given in discretionary, rather than mandatory 
terms. It says that the motorist's license "can be revoked" 
if he or she refuses to submit to tests. This "warning" is 
inaccurate and misleading because it does not provide adequate 
notice to the motorist that his or her license will be revoked 
upon refusal. 
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U.C.A. §41-6-44.10 (c) requires, in mandatory terms, 
that the Division of Motor Vehicles revoke the motorist's 
license upon a finding that the motorist refused to submit to 
the test. In order to be fair and accurate, the warning ought 
to clearly inform the motorist of the true consequences of 
such a refusal. 
It is fundamentally unfair for the state to "warn" a 
motorist that his or her license "may be revoked" when the 
state simultaneously requires the division to revoke a license 
on a finding of refusal to submit to a requested test. If the 
state requires that a license be revoked upon a finding of 
refusal, then the state ought to provide notice that a 
motorist's license shall be revoked because of that refusal. 
The discretionary language of U.C.A. 
§41-6-44.10(2)(a), may have been an inadvertent lapse of 
precision by the legislature. It is hard to believe that the 
legislature would intentionally play cat-and-mouse with a 
citizen arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol by 
requiring police to provide a misleading statement of the 
consequences of a refusal to submit to a test. 
Whether the fault is in the statute or in the 
regulatory interpretation of the statute, due process requires 
that the warning adequately reflect the certain consequences 
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that driving privileges shall be revoked for one year as a 
result of a motorist's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol 
test. 
The Utah Constitutional provision for Due Process is 
required by Article I, §26 of the Utah Constitution which 
provides that MThe provisions of this Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are 
declared to be otherwise." 
B. The present admonitions do not provide sufficient 
notice of the consequences of a refusal to submit to the 
requested test. 
The present standard warning uses permissive language 
(i.e., your license may be revoked, your driver's license can 
be revoked) which in fact the license will be revoked absent 
narrow and unexplained circumstance. 
If you refused the test, it will not be given, 
however I must warn you that if you refuse, your 
license or permit to drive a motor vehicle may 
be revoked for one year with no provision for a 
limited driver's license. After you have taken 
this test, you will be permitted to have a 
physician of your own choice administer a test 
at your own expense, in addition to the one I 
have requested you to submit to, so long as it 
does not delay the test or tests requested by 
me. Upon your request, I will make available to 
you the results of the test if you take it. 
Your right to remain silent and your right to 
counsel do not apply to the implied consent law 
which is civil in nature and separate from the 
criminal charges. Your right to remain silent 
does not give you the right to refuse to take 
the test. You do not have the right to have 
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counsel during the test procedure. Unless you 
submit to the test I am requesting, I will 
consider that you have refused to take the 
test. I warn you that if you refuse to take the 
test, your driver's license can be revoked for 
one year with no provision for a limited license. 
(Cite. Emphasis added.) 
Only after the decision not to submit is made by the 
motorist does the standard notice change from permissive 
language to the mandatory language of the law. 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND OR REVOKE: You are 
hereby notified that thirty-one (31) days from 
the date of this notice your privilege to 
operate motor vehicles in the State of Utah will 
be suspended pursuant to Section 41-2-130 U.C.A. 
for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter, or 
for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if 
this is the second or subsequent occurrence of 
this offense OR if a peace officer has indicated 
you have refused to submit to a chemical test to 
determine the alcohol or drug content of your 
breath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified 
that thirty-one (31) days from the date of this 
notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles 
in the State of Utah will be revoked pursuant to 
41-6-44.10 U.C.A. for a period of one (1) year. 
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REQUEST A HEARING ON THIS 
SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION. The hearing is not 
for purposes of granting you a limited license 
but only to determine whether or not your 
license should be suspended or revoked. 
The department will NOT contact you further 
regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing 
in writing. Your WRITTEN REQUEST must be sent 
WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest to 
the DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION AT 4501 South 2700 
West, P.O. Box 30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84130-0560. Upon your timely written request 
for a hearing you will be notified of a time and 
place to appear. If you fail to appear or 
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request a hearing, your driver license 
suspension or revocation will become effective 
as indicated above. The administrative hearing 
is civil in nature and does not satisfy the 
requirement for you to appear in Court. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an effective 
refusal to submit to a requested test for blood alcohol levels 
requires the comprehension of the arrestee's rights by the 
arrestee. Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451 (Utah 1976), Gassman 
v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975). In Hyde, the revocation 
of defendant's license based on her constructive refusal was 
reversed because the was too upset to form a "sentient consent 
or refusal." 549 P.2d at 452. 
In Gassman, the revocation of defendant's license was 
reversed when the defendant was confused by the officer's 
request for a breathalyzer test after the officer had agreed 
to defendant's offer to submit to a blood test. There, as in 
the present case, the defendant offered to submit to a test 
and failed to understand the consequences of refusing the 
proffered breathalyzer test. 
It is a small thing to change the present admonition 
from its present permissive language to the more accurate 
mandatory language. This change would put Utah in line with 
the clearer warnings given in similar circumstances to 
motorists in other states, such as Oklahoma and Idaho. 
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In Oklahoma, an explicit warning in the mandatory 
language is required for the warning to be legally binding. 
Smith v. State Dept. of Safety, 680 P.2d 365, 368 (Oklahoma 
1984). (Four necessary elements to warning, including that 
the motorist's M. . . (d) privilege to drive would be revoked 
or denied if he refused to submit to the test or tests." 
(Emphasis added.)) 
In Idaho, the legal admonition is published with the 
approval of the Idaho Supreme Court in, State v. Griffiths, 
744 P.2d 92, 94 (Idaho 1987) as follows: 
(1) I have reasonable grounds to believe that 
you have been driving (or that you were in 
physical control of) a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of alcohol, drugs or other 
intoxicating substance. 
(2) You are required by state law to submit to 
an evidentiary chemical test to determine the 
alcohol concentration of your blood. 
(3) You do not have the right to consult with 
an attorney before submitting to an evidentiary 
test for alcohol concentration. 
(4) If you refuse my offered test, I am 
required by law to seize your license or permit 
and forward it to the court, and a temporary 
driving permit will be issued. 
(5) Upon receipt of my sworn statement of the 
circumstances of the refusal, the court shall 
suspend your driving privileges for 120 days. 
(6) You have the right to file a written 
request with the court within (7) days, for a 
hearing before the court to show cause why you 
did not take or successfully complete the test. 
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If you file the written request, the hearing 
must be scheduled within 30 days of the 
request. The hearing shall be limited to the 
question of why you did not take the test, and 
the burden of proof shall be upon you, 
(7) After submitting to the test requested by 
me, you may, when practicable, have additional 
tests made by a person of your own choosing, and 
at no expense to the state, county or city. The 
failure or inability to obtain an additional 
test or tests by you shall not preclude the 
admission of an evidentiary test for alcohol 
concentration taken at my direction unless the 
additional test was denied by me. Your refusal 
to take my test can be commented on and is 
admissible in court at trial, 
(8) Do you understand what I have told you? 
(9) Will you submit to the test offered by me? 
(Emphasis added) 
In this case the Utah Uniform DUI Citation is 
misleading and should be declared violative of petitioner's 
due process rights. The admonitions must contain clear, 
unequivocal language that the driver will lose his license for 
a year if he refuses the test. Although a license to drive a 
motor vehicle is a privilege, it is a privilege essential to 
the maintenance of a job or occupation, particularly in the 
Uintah Basin which has no form of public transportation. In 
order to remove the operator's license for one year, the 
Department's warning of the consequences must be clear as to 
the consequences. 
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C. All warnings of revocation should have uniform 
operation under the Utah Constitution, 
The warning of revocation of a commercial driver's 
license for refusal to submit to blood alcohol tests is worded 
in the mandatory sense throughout the relevant statute. 
O.C.A. §41-2-717. 
(4) When a peace officer requests a person to 
submit to tests under this section he shall 
advise the person that „ . . [a] refusal to 
submit to any test requested will result in the 
person's disqualification . . . from operating a 
commercial motor vehicle. (Emphasis added) 
(5) If . . . the person refuses to submit to 
any test requested under this section, the 
officer on behalf of the division serve the 
person with immediate notice of the divisions 
intention to disqualify the person's privilege 
to operate a commercial vehicle. (Emphasis 
added) 
The Utah Constitution, Article 1# §24, provides: All 
laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. The 
general nature of implied consent in both the commercial 
driver's license statute and the regular driver's license 
statute is similar: The privilege will be revoked if the 
motorist refuses to submit to blood alcohol test, and the 
revocation is mandatory in both cases. Therefore, the 
operation of the statutes should also be similar in their 
warnings of the mandatory revocation. 
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D. The admonition read to petitioner failed to 
adequately advise him that the officer had the sole discretion 
to determine which test, breath, blood or urine, the 
petitioner would be required to take and that failure to take 
the test requested by the officer would constitute a refusal. 
The admonitions on the Uniform DUI Citation contained 
the following language: 
Mr, or Mrs. , do you understand 
that you are under arrest for driving under the 
influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if 
any) I 
hereby request that you submit to a chemical 
test of your blood. I request you take 
a (breath-blood-urine) test. 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, 
however I must warn you that if you refuse, your 
license or permit to drive a motor vehicle may 
be revoked for one year with no provision for a 
limited driver's license. After you have taken 
this test, you will be permitted to have a 
physician of your own choice administer a test 
at your own expense, in addition to the one I 
have requested you to submit to, so long as it 
does not delay the test or tests requested by 
me. Upon your request, I will make available to 
you the results of the test if you take it. 
The above admonition mentions a chemical test "to 
determine the alcohol content of your blood" but fails to 
state unequivocably that the officer has the sole discretion 
to determine which test will be given. The statement tends to 
mislead because it implies that submitting to a chemical test 
of blood is sufficient to qualify for testing. 
In this case, the petitioner agreed to submit to a 
chemical test of the blood. Because the admonition read to 
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petitioner failed to clearly advise him that the officer has 
the sole discretion to determine which test would be given and 
that refusal to take the test requested by the officer 
constitutes a refusal, the admonition fails under a due 
process analysis. First, it fails to inform an individual 
that §41-6-44,10 gives the officer exclusive discretion over 
the test or tests to be given. It also fails to clearly 
inform a defendant he may not choose which test to be taken. 
Indeed, the admonition states "submit to a chemical test to 
determine the alcohol content of your blood." 
The admonition must mirror the language of the law in 
order to comply with due process. A misleading admonition is 
worse than no warning at all. The poorly worded admonition 
should not be the basis for declaring a refusal in this case 
and should be deemed violative of his due process rights. The 
petitioner's license should therefore be returned to him. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the decision of the District 
Court should be reversed and appellant's license should be 
returned to him forthwith. 
ft* 
Respectfully submitted this ^Q day of April, 1990. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
HARRY R/ SOUVALL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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i period of ninety (90) days thereafter, or for a period of one hundred twenty (120) days if this is the second 
quent occurrence of this offense OR if a peace officer has indicated you have refused to submit to a 
test to determine the alcohol or drug content of your breath, blood or urine, you are hereby notified 
f-one (31) days from the date of this notice your privilege to operate motor vehicles in the State of 
be revoked pursuant to 41-6-44.10 UCA for a period of one (1) year. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RE-
HEARING ON THIS SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION. The hearing is not for purposes of granting you 
license but only to determine whether or not your license should be suspended or revoked. 
>artment will NOT contact you further regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing. Your WRIT-
IUEST must be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of arrest to the DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION at 
th 2700 West, P.O. Box 30560, Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560. Upon your timely written request for a 
)u will be notified of a time and place to appear. If you fail to appear or request a hearing, your driver license 
>n or revocation will become effective as indicated above. The administrative hearing is civil in nature and 
satisfy the requirement for you to appear in court. 
\RY DRIVER LICENSE: This entire information >Tis VALID as a temporary driver license for a period of 
days from the date of this notice • is NOT VALID as a temporary driver license. /p> fr5\ W^Rs/7 
I U L ^ t J J L ^ l 
DUI REPORT FORM 
CASE IDENTIFICATION: / 
Date .T-S* a7? Day P^cLy Accident MJ Case ft ffi-0W2W Time Prepared (00 bQ 
Subject's Name Sk^^^J I $„,L*,K * Address P.D /L* /?£c/ 
Place of Employment S*~ rr &^/cy *^7 Address 
Home Telephone Number Work Telephone Number . 
DO.B. _ _ A 2 - / > - Vff Driver License # 9 193.0^0 I i m V o f A r r e s t & 3 3 n -
Place of Arrest SZa^c* W / 5*r^r, -UuZL*^*, Charges Jjlll 
Arresting Officer Afc*^ , * 2 . &u^,^ Assisting Officers fiaJ( //**-»•,jt,? tiJi.ll X^,,S 
Arresting Agency J/J*( A /KA a , ^ / v / i c / nally / / < ^ . J & H 
VEHICLE /J 
Year / ? / £ Color / ^ v ^ / 7 ^ < w Make A / ^ / Model / * f f 
License // and state <?fgJ/ >4/J 1/J£>\ Disposition A^*^.lL*/ ^XfiS', 
Registered Owner Address 
WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 
Name Address Tele ft Age/DOB 
a 
4. 
5. 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control o* i motor veh iH* r.fo _
 u 5P1. A <•< (//,*, x 
DRIVING PATTERN: J J /) / 
Subject's location when first observed £1 u / ^ r K //( i^/g^/iv* , 
The fdcts observed regarding driying patterh^ T • f u ^ ^ . y A J* J^u^ ^r/e^t <ue^i <>>[ /k^/**** 
PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT:
 f L / / / J / 
*i* t j . U/he*. 2 <*(J L* A*. ^ J > tut* *A« ^ ^ A«* «./>V / < J±<J\ ft/e// ilcf 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: it Odor of alcoholic beverage * M ^ S T?^ uJL^dLL
 :^ ^ ^J—-/? -^ ; — 1 
Speech *+k>^A' Vcu,*j*A -H?>*<L ^t^ JL $ I<t^-*-«r *.*.*( so**. <?\Ji or—v*-d*K
 t 
Balance _p.tmjt^ / J-J -4—jj f •—f 
Signs or Complaints of injury or illness ?y*s u ^ ^ V v ^ > ^kn<^—<i/7/3 e^^^^ f ^^< Ldt\ / , 
Other physical characteristics —— 
\^Y 4*c{ gs+Jr <jfi^4^ V^y-**- Vo ^ou^ /Xc/*T ^ t t rvY , / w , T / ^ v / , fr, ^ y / ^ r f > U r<iY 
JQK.^ /*fr , 3 ^ w i .Cy4ft\*4'l J-Q jj^r * M d S^J > V « * s j .y,
 n +i*Ar* />t^ Viif il&Wn r C. &JLL***/ 
fere tests demonstrated by officer? i /^s Subject's ability to follow instructions / A J C A • _ 
(EARCHES 
v. Vehicle: / / \ f 
Was subject's vehicle searched? U-€b Where? < ^ fl'*-*** ^ ht»p* . 
When? ^ 2 1 ( 2 Evidence jTfou ,-£vft( j f \y^jKy 3 Ay, u,/V^ , ^ - - . *.__ 
Person who performed the search ' ' * * , ' ' V ^ T ' ^ " " ^ * " ^ 3 e < ^ * * * * • 
3. Subject: . 
Was subject's person searched? No v Where? 
When? Evidence Found 
Person who performed the search 
CHEMICAL TESTS: , 
Mr. orJVIrs. ft i c q^^^ , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (drugs)? Response, (if any) V>6yo-
hereby lequest that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your blood. I 1 nereuy lequest thai you sub it to a che ical lest tO/0pier ine the alcohol (drug) content of yoi 
request that you lake a i/d+s<~&\ , tesj. / / / / 
(blood-breath-urine) / l / W JU*>*JytuA-* '^y 
& The following admonition was given by me to the s»fh;rct before th* rf-enic-ji test was adminis-
tered: 
Results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in your blood shall, and the existence ol n Mood 
alcohol content or presence of drugs sufficient to render you incapable of safely driving a vHiicli* may, 
result in suspension or revocation of your license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. 
•Wha^ isf youn response to my request that yoy submit* to a chemical test? j ^ o o n s e : j~ 
A L . Did subject submit to a chemical test? _ Type of test 
Test Administered by Where? 
Time: Results Was subject notified of results? 
Serial No. of test machine: \YJ Jn *? / ' 
(if the subject refuses the lest, read the following) 
1X The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
If you refuse the test, it will not be given, however I must warn you that if you refuse, your license or 
permit to drive a motor vehicle may be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited driver's license. 
After you have laken this lesl. you will be permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer 
a test at your own expense, in addition lo the one I have requested you to submit to, so long as it does 
tor* hu mb Unon.vour rea l is t , jjwill m$ke available to you the results - - #^»#-»l<~ r " r t n i t Q c [ £ 
(if the subject claims tne right to remain silent or the right to counsel, read the following:) 
• The following admonition was given by me to the subject: 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which 
is civil in nature and separate from the criminal charges. Your right to remain silent does not give you 
the right to refuse to take the test. You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure. 
Unless you submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test. 
I warn you that if you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with 
no provision for a limited license. 
<l. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: 
Was subject advised of the following rights? y*~3 When , ^ 3 - T ^ 
By Whom? A f l r t / / < L 6IUXIA 7 Where? VC S p 
1^\. You have the right to remain silent. 
k2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
Lf3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being ques-
tioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
. any questioning, if you wish one. 
If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answer-
ing questions at any time. Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning. 
Were the following waiver questions asked? 
J L ' 1 . DO you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? 
Response __ r *' - Ui -
±1 Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk ,to usynow? J f fi / h / 
Response f Z JCT^ S / U ^ ^JL. A^> C^ ~^f^ td
 d .ye^fr A^t^ y J' ^ ^ o ^ / u y ^frv., 
INTERVIEW: 
Were you operating a vehicle? ^ ^ L ^ f* 
Where were you going? u fij*t±,..tJ^\~ , 
What street or highway were you on?fl jif^Jl^* /!<r~l-
Direction of travel? ^ATH
 ? / * J ru^uH j J 
Where did you start from^ U^/at*- \ftjhu, / 
When? .>*///£ X^\^. w lat time is it now? T~u,e;b<L. o <J^J{ 
What is today's date? v ^ iv< i -r - / \vc Day of week? P N r a *y 
(Actual time Date / * Day 
What city or county are you in now? Ai.^/ein^ f) ^ ,1*.$^^- ,-t 
What were you doing during the last three hours? /Ow »v »^t ^ U - A 
Have you been drinking? . 
What? d l m k t i l l oH- u, k \ s L y ; , c / I AS'/ HnW much? ^ n jj r. frifJo //"/-
Where? VJUaW ^ v . - J i U ^ P^JWi* J , 
When did you have your first drink? \i/itHv>» ~Prtu.Otiu Last dcink? "TL> u*., ~il* «i>HT ^ 7 il 
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now? '^S* • 
- l a axL 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills, medicines or drugs of any kind? N^JU 
(What kind? Get sample) 
When did you have the last dose? 
Are you ill? 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions:) 
Were vou involved in an accident today? 
XII. OTHER OCCURRENCES.QR FACTS: , , , I i „• / , * / , , / 
±{iJ±2±d--.?f»f* Af H<?r-~. KscAt^j , / / / / J a/ 77 7 
-taLf JL 4' 4 / ^ U i &. f- C rfSf K i ^ g 
XIII. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. £3 Copy of citation/temporary license 
2. )6 Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
3. D Traffic accident report 
4. H Other documents (specify) 
I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peaco Officer and that the information contained above in this report form and attached 
<U iimuits is true and com-! ;u M ; :.;.w»*iruyy anrt fc:!ief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my 
duiicb. It is my belief the subject was in violation of section 41-6-44 U.C.A. at the date, time, and place specified in this report. 
Signature of Peace Officer 
 ffi r , J /? / / 
Law Enforcement Agency: j^H^k NtftuMy, /* Vs* / 
Date: £*-£-!?? Time: /^^S^ 
The original of this form must be sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to: 
Driver License Division 
4501 South 2700 West 
P.O. Box 30560 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0560 
AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
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ART. I, §7 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Gun control laws, validity and constri 
tion of, 28 A. L. R. 3d 845. 
Law Reviews. 
The Constitutional Right to Keep a 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of li 
process of law. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. Ill, §27. 
Cross-Reference. 
Eminent domain generally, 78-34-1 et 
seq. 
In general. 
"Due process of law" comes to us from 
the Great Charter and is synonymous with 
"law of the land." It means that a party 
shall have his day in court—trial. Jensen 
v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 6 U. 253, 21 P. 994, 
4 L. R. A. 724. 
Due process of law is not necessarily 
judicial process. People v. Hasbrouck, 11 
U. 291, 39 P. 918. 
Judgment against defendant, not served 
with process and not appearing either in 
person or by attorney, would not be due 
process of law. Blyth & Fargo Co. v. 
Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027. 
It is elementary that there can be no 
judicial action affecting vested rights that 
is not based upon some process or notice 
whereby the interested parties are brought 
within the jurisdiction of the judicial 
tribunal about to render judgment. Parry 
v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 71 U. 202, 263 P. 
751. 
"Due process of law" requires that, be-
fore one can be bound by a judgment 
affecting his property rights, some process 
must be served upon him which in some 
degree at least is calculated to give him 
notice. Naisbitt v. Herrick, 76 U. 575, 
290 P. 950. 
Due process of law requires that notice 
be given to the persons whose rights are 
to be affected. It hears before it con-
demns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. Riggins v. Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, 89 U. 
183, 51 P. 2d 645. 
The phrase "due process of law" appar-
ently originated with Lord Coke, who de-
fined the terms. Many attempts have been 
made to further define due process of law, 
but all of them resolve into the thought 
that a party shall have his day in court. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 
2d 314. 
In depriving a person of life or lib-
erty, the essentials of due process are: 
(a) the existence of a competent person, 
c- Bear Arms, Lucilius A. Emery, 28 Harv 
L. Rev. 473. 
Restrictions on the Right To Bc.ir AHUM 
— State and Federal Firearms Legislation 
id 08 U. Pa. L. Rev. 905. 
i, liberty or property, without due 
body, or agency authorized by law to de-
termine the questions; (b) an inquiry 
into the merits of the question by such 
person, body or agency; (c) notice to the 
person of the inauguration and purpose 
of the inquiry and the time at which 
such person should appear if he wishes 
to be heard; (d) right to appear in per-
son or by counsel; (e) fair opportunity 
to submit evidence, examine and cross-
examine witnesses; (f) judgment to be 
rendered upon the record thus made. In 
the absence of statute laying down other 
or more specific requirements, the above 
conditions meet the demands of due 
process. In the absence of specific pro-
visions to the contrary, due process does 
not require that any or all of these 
requirements must be in writing or in 
any particular form. In the interests of 
orderly procedure and certainty as to its 
proceedings and action taken, any legally 
constituted body or agency should as far 
as practical have written records of all 
proceedings before it, except where other-
wise provided by law. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314. 
In the trial of criminal cases the stat-
utes prescribe certain rules of procedure, 
which must be substantially complied with 
to keep the proceedings within the due 
processes of the law, A somewhat dif-
ferent set of rules is prescribed in civil 
cases and in special proceedings. Some 
rules, affecting all types, are not found in 
the statutes, but in that great basic body 
of the law commonly known as the deci-
sions or rules of the courts. But all these 
methods and means provided for the pro-
tection and enforcement of human rights 
have the same basic requirements—that 
no party can be affected by such action, 
until his legal rights have been the sub-
ject of an inquiry by a person or body 
authorized by law to determine such 
rights, of which inquiry the party has due 
notice, and at which be had an opportu-
nity to be heard and to give evidence as 
to his rights or defenses. Christiansen v. 
Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314. 
While normally we think of "due proc-
ess of law" as requiring judicial action, 
yet "due process" is not necessarily judi-
cial action. Christiansen v. Jlarri.s, 109 
U. 1, 163 P. 2d 314, 
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ART. I, § 12 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Land Registration Act. 
The Torrcns Act was not unconstitu-
tional as conferring judicial powers on 
registrar of titles. Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. 
Bramel, 5G U. 587, 192 P. 375, 11 A. L. R. 
752. 
Limitation of actions. 
This section does not preclude the legis-
lature from prescribing a statute of limi-
tations for time within which to assail 
the regularity or organization of an irri-
gation district. Horn v. Shaffer, 47 U. 55, 
151 P. 555. 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in 
excluding compensation for partial disa-
bility from silicosis, and in rendering 
remedy under that act exclusive so as to 
abrogate common-law right of action 
therefor, is not unconstitutional as depriv-
ing such employee of his remedy by due 
course of law for injury done to his per-
son. Masich v. United States Smelting, 
Ref. & Min. Co., 113 U. 101, 191 P. 2d 612. 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of 
wrong is substantial right, and will not 
be waived by contract except through 
unequivocal language. Bracken v. Dahle, 
C8 U. 486, 251 P. 16. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse 
to courts under Workmen's Compensation 
Act concerning question of their ultimate 
liability. Industrial Comm. v. Evans, 5* 
U. 394, 174 P. S25. 
Workmen's Compensation Act is not in-
valid because it delegates to industrial 
commission the power to hear, consider 
and determine controversies between liti-
gants as to ultimate liability, or their 
property rights. Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 57 U. 246, 194 P. 122. 
Dependents of employee killed by acta 
of third party, a stranger to employment, 
are not limited to recovery under Work-
men's Compensation Act exclusively, un-
less they have assigned their rights to 
insurance carrier. Robinson v. Union Pac. 
R. Co., 70 U. 441, 261 P. 9. 
Collateral References. 
Constitutional LawC=>322, 324, 327, 328. 
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 709, 711, 
714, 719. 
16 Am. Jur. 2d 718-721, Constitutional 
Law §§ 382-385. 
Law Reviews. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 
Edward L. Barrett, Jr., 35 Calif. L. Rev. 
380. 
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens 
in Anglo-American Law, Paxton Blair, 29 
Colum. L. Rev. 1. 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
L. Rev. 248. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. Ill , § 16. 
Cross-Kef erences. 
Defendant as witness, 77-44-5. 
Double jeopardy, statutory provision, 
77-M0. 
—acquittal notwithstanding defect in in-
formation or indictment, 77-24-12. 
—acquittal or dismissal without judg-
ment, 77-24-11. 
—acts punishable in different ways, 
punishment limited to one, 76-1-23. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. I, § 24 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege 
or immunity. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Const., Art. Il l , § 11. 
Alcoholic beverages. 
Former Liquor Control Act held not un-
constitutional as violative of this section. 
Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v. Stewart, 
82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 229. 
State legislature was acting within its 
power in enacting Liquor Control Act, 
which in effect revoked previously granted 
license authorizing the sale of light beer. 
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, 89 IT. 183, 51 P. 2d 645. 
Pioneer Memorial Building. 
Act pertaining to leasing of portion of 
state capitoi grounds to Daughters of 
Utah Pioneers for erection and mainte-
nance of Pioneer Memorial Building, and 
amendments thereto making appropria-
tions therefor, as well as appropriation of 
$150,000 (or that building, were not vio-
lative of this section. Thomas v. Daugh-
ters of Utah Pioneers, 114 U. 108, 197 
P. 2d 477, appeal dismissed for want of a 
properly presented substantial federal 
question, 336 U. S. 930, 93 L. Ed. 10U0, 
69 S. Ct. 739. 
Collateral References. 
Franchises<§=»ll. 
37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26. 
36 Am. 
§§ 9-23. 
Jur. 2d 733-745, Franchises 
Competition by grantor of nonexclusive 
franchise, or provision therefor, as viola-
tion of constitutional rights of franchise 
holder, 114 A. L. R. 192. 
Inclusion of different franchise rights 
or purposes in same ordinance, 127 A. L. 
R. 1049. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Cross-Reference. 
Prohibition on private or special laws, 
Const., Art. VI, §26. 
In general 
All laws shall operate uniformly wher-
ever uniform laws can be enacted. State 
v. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 200 P. 894, 26 
A. L. R. 696. 
Objects and purposes of law present 
touchstone for determining proper and 
improper classifications. State v. Mason, 
94 U. 501, 78 P. 2d 920, 117 A. L. R. 330; 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
One who assails legislative classifica-
tion as arbitrary has burden of proving 
it to be such. State v. J. B. & R. E. Walk-
er, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
Classification is never unreasonable or 
arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion 
features so long as there is some basis for 
differentiation between classes or subject 
matters included, as compared to those 
excluded, provided differentiation bears 
reasonable relation to purposes of act. 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
Before legislative enactment can be in-
terfered with, court must be able to say 
that there is no fair reason for the law 
that would not require equally its exten-
sion to those which it leaves untouched. 
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 
U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
Only where some persons or transac-
tions excluded from operation of law are, 
as to the subject matter of the law, in 
no differentiable class from those in-
cluded in its operation, is the law 
discriminatory in the sense of being arbi-
trary and unconstitutional, and if reason-
able basis to differentiate can be found, 
law must' be held constitutional. State v. 
J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 
P. 2d 766. 
Inability of legislature to make perfect 
classification does not render statute un-
constitutional. State v. J. B. & R, E. 
Walker, Inc., 100 U. 523, 116 P. 2d 766. 
In determining whether classification 
made by legislature is unconstitutional, 
discrimination is very essence of classi-
fication and is not objectionable unless 
founded upon unreasonable distinctions. 
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284, 
194 P. 2d 464. 
An act is never unconstitutional be-
cause of discrimination as long as there is 
some reasonable basis for differentiation 
between classes which is related to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the act, 
and it applies uniformly to all persons 
within the class. Hansen v. Public Em-
ployees' Retirement System Board of Ad-
ministration, 122 U. 44, 246 P. 2d 591. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ART. I l l 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, 
unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Comparable Provision. government. Ritchie v. Richards, 14 U. 
Montana Const., Art. I l l , § 29. 345, 47 P. 670. 
Mandatory provisions. Collateral References. 
Mandatory provisions of Constitution Constitutional LavrC=>35. 
are conclusive on each of departments of 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 62. 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the 
security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free government. 
Collateral References. 
Constitutional Law<§=»12. 
16 C.J'.S. Constitutional Law §15. 
ARTICLE II 
STATE BOUNDARIES 
Section 
1. [State boundaries.] 
Section 1. [State boundaries.] 
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as follows: 
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of the thirty-second 
degree of longitude west from Washington, with the thirty-seventh de-
gree of north latitude; thence due west along said thirty-seventh degree 
of north latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-seventh 
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said 
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the intersection of the same 
with the forty-second degree of north latitude; thence due east along 
said forty-second degree of north latitude to the intersection of the 
same with the thirty-fourth degree of longitude west from Washington; 
thence due south along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the 
intersection of the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude; 
thence due east along said forty-first degree of north latitude to the 
intersection of the same with the thirty-second degree of longitude west 
from Washington; thence due south along said thirty-second degree of 
west longitude to the place of beginning. 
ARTICLE III 
ORDINANCE 
[Religious toleration—Polygamy forbidden.] 
[Right to public domain disclaimed—Taxation of lands—Exemption.] 
[Territorial debt* assumed*] 
[Free, nonsectarian schools,] 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of 
the United States and the people of this State: 
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(b) When the division suspends, revokes, or cancels a nonresident CDL, 
it shall notify the licensing authority of the issuing state within ten days 
after the action is taken. 
(8) (a) The division may immediately suspend the CDL of a driver without 
hearing or receiving a record of conviction when the division has reason 
to believe the license was issued by the division through error or fraud, or 
the applicant provided incorrect or incomplete information to the divi-
sion. 
(b) Suspension of a CDL under this subsection shall be in accordance 
with Section 41-2-128. 
(c) If a hearing is held under this section, the division shall then re-
scind the suspension order or cancel the license. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-715, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, § 35. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-716. Measurable alcohol amount consumed — Pen-
alty — Refusal to take test for alcohol. 
(1) A person may not drive, operate, or be in physical control of a commer-
cial motor vehicle while there is any measurable or detectable alcohol in his 
body. 
(2) The division or a law enforcement officer shall place a person out-of-
service for 24 consecutive hours who: 
(a) violates Subsection (1); or 
(b) refuses a request to submit to a test to determine the alcohol con-
centration of his blood, breath, or urine. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-716, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, 5 36. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-717. Prohibited alcohol level for operators — Proce-
dures, including hearing. 
(1) It is unlawful and punishable under Section 41-2-715 for a person to 
drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of a commercial motor vehicle 
in this state if the person: 
(a) has a blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration of .04 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged driving, operation, or physical control of the commercial motor 
vehicle; or 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influ-
ence of alcohol and any drug to any degree that renders the person inca-
pable of safely operating a commercial motor vehicle. 
(2) A person who drives a commercial motor vehicle in this state is consid-
ered to have given his consent subject to Section 41-6-44.10 to a test or tests of 
his blood, breath, or urine to determine the concentration of alcohol in his 
physical system or the presence of other drugs in his physical system. 
(3) When a peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person may 
be violating this section, the peace officer may request the person to submit to 
chemical tests to be administered in compliance with Section 41-6-44.3. 
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(4) When a peace officer requests a person to submit to tests under this 
section, he shall advise the person that test results indicating .04 grams or 
greater alcohol concentration or refusal to submit to any test requested will 
result in the person's disqualification under Section 41-2-715 from operating a 
commercial motor vehicle. 
(5) If test results under this section indicate .04 grams or greater of alcohol 
concentration or the person refuses to submit to any test requested under this 
section, the officer shall on behalf of the division serve the person with imme-
diate notice of the division's intention to disqualify the person's privilege to 
operate a commercial vehicle. 
(6) When the officer serves notice under Subsection (5) he shall: 
(a) take any Utah license certificate or permit held by the driver; 
(b) issue to the driver a temporary license effective for 30 days; 
(c) provide the driver, on a form approved by the division, basic infor-
mation regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the division; and 
(d) issue a 24-hour out-of-service order. 
(7) A notice of disqualification issued under Subsection (6) may serve also 
as the temporary license under that subsection, if the form is approved by the 
division. 
(8) The peace officer serving the notice of disqualification shall, within five 
days after the date of service, send to the division the person's license, a copy 
of the served notice, and a report signed by the officer that indicates the 
results of any chemical tests administered or that the person refused the tests. 
(9) The person has the right to a hearing regarding the disqualification 
within 30 days after the notice was issued. The request for the hearing shall 
be submitted to the division in writing and shall be made within ten days of 
the date the notice was issued. 
(10) (a) A hearing held under this section shall be held before the division 
and in the county where the notice was issued, unless the division agrees 
to hold the hearing in another county. 
(b) The hearing shall be documented and shall determine: 
(i) whether the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
person had been operating a motor vehicle in violation of this section; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to any requested tests; 
and 
(iii) any test results obtained. 
(c) In connection with a hearing the division or its authorized agent 
may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant books and documents. 
(d) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing. 
(e) A decision made after a hearing before any number of members of 
the division is as valid as if the hearing were held before the full member-
ship of the division. 
(f) After a hearing under this section the division shall indicate by 
order if the person's CDL is disqualified. 
(11) If the division disqualifies a person under this section, the person may 
petition for a hearing under Section 41-2-131. The petition shall be filed 
within 30 days after the division issues the disqualification. 
(12) In accordance with Section 41-2-715, the first disqualification under 
this section shall be for one year, and a second disqualification shall be for life. 
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(13) (a) In addition to the fees imposed under Section 41-2-112 for rein-
statement of a CDL, a fee under Section 41-2-103 to cover administrative 
costs shall be paid before the driving privilege is reinstated. 
(b) The fee under Section 41-2-103 shall be canceled if an unappealed 
hearing at the division or court level determines the disqualification was 
not proper. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-717, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, § 37. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989.' 
41-2-718. Nonresident operator violations reported to resi-
dent state. 
When the division receives a report of the conviction of a nonresident holder 
of a CDL for a violation of a state law or local ordinance relating to traffic 
control, the division shall notify the driver licensing authority in the licensing 
state within ten days of receipt of the report. This section does not apply to 
parking violations. 
History. C. 1953, 41-2-718, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, § 38. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-719. Operator's driving record available for certain 
purposes. 
The division shall provide full information regarding the driving record of 
any holder of a CDL to: 
(1) the driver license administrator of any other state requesting that 
information; 
(2) any employer or prospective employer of a person to drive a com-
mercial motor vehicle upon request and payment of a fee under Section 
41-2-103; and 
(3) insurers of commercial motor vehicle drivers upon request and pay-
ment of a fee under Section 41-2-103. 
History. C. 1953, 41-2-719, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 290, 
1989, ch. 290, § 39. § 41 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
41-2-720. Authority to drive commercial motor vehicle in 
Utah. 
(1) A person may drive a commercial motor vehicle in this state if: 
(a) the person has a commercial driver license issued by any state or 
province or territory of Canada in accordance with the minimum federal 
standards for the issuance of commercial motor vehicle driver licenses; 
(b) the person's license is not suspended, revoked, canceled, or disquali-
fied; and 
(c) he is not disqualified from driving a commercial motor vehicle. 
(2) This section supersedes any provision to the contrary. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Relation back of test results. the incident by expert testimony to be admissi-
Results of chemical analysis test were not ble as evidence. State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d 
required to be extrapolated back to the time of 1267 (Utah 1978). 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may 
prosecute for driving while license suspended or 
revoked. 
Alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which consist of the person operating 
a vehicle while his operator's license is suspended or revoked for a violation of 
Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with the requirements of 
Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibi-
tion that the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain 
after having been originally charged with violating one or more of those 
sections or ordinances, may be prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as 
well as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this code to prosecute 
those alleged violations. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L. stituted "person operating a vehicle" for wper-
1983, ch. 102, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 40. son driving" and deleted "or chauffeur's" fol-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- lowing "while his operator's." 
ment substituted "41-2-136" for "41-2-28," sub-
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or 
drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap-
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence, 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request 
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section 
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other 
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test 
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or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test requested by 
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the re-
quested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been re-
quested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or 
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the 
test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be adminis-
tered, no test may be given. A peace officer shall serve on the person, on 
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to re-
voke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the 
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the divi-
sion. A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form 
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer 
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the 
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(b) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke 
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the 
hearing shall be made in writing, and within ten days after the date of 
the arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division 
shall notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practica-
ble. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing 
before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall 
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the 
date of arrest. 
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the divi-
sion, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the 
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division 
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 41-2-112(6), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative 
costs. The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court 
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decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper, 
(d) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division un-
der this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a 
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person 
resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition render-
ing him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace offi-
cer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason 
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or crimi-
nal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug. 
History: C. 1953,41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 
1987, ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 41; 1987, 
ch. 161, 5 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, $§ 3, 4; 
1988, ch. 148, § 1. 
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1981, 
ch. 126, § 43 repealed former § 41-6-44.10 (L. 
1957, ch. 80, §[1]; 1959, ch. 65, § 1; 1967, ch. 
88, § 3; 1969, ch. 107, 5 3; 1977, ch. 268, § 4), 
relating to implied consent to tests, and en-
acted present § 41-6-44.10. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 129, rewrote the provisions 
of Subsection (2) as last amended by Laws 
1983, ch. 99, § 16 to the extent that a detailed 
analysis is impracticable and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the entire section. 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from district court in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs involving a 
criminal conviction, except those involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding but not limited to divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, i 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, { 141; 1988, ch. 
24St i 8. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend* 
ment by Laws 1988, Chapter 73, effective April 
25, 1988, inserted subsection designations (a) 
and (b) in Subsection (1); inserted "resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings'1 in Sub-
section (2)(a); substituted "state agencies" for 
"state and local agencies" in Subsection (2Xa); 
substituted "informal adjudicative proceedings 
of the agencies" for "them" in Subsection (2Ma); 
deleted "notwithstanding any other provision 
of law" at the end of Subsection (2Xa); inserted 
Subsection (b); redesignated former Subsec-
tions (2Kb) to (2)(h) as Subsections (2Xc) to 
(2)(i); added "except those from the small 
claims department of a circuit court" at the end 
of Subsection (2)(d); and made minor stylistic 
changes. 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 210, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsec-
tion (2Kb) and redesignated former Subsection 
(2)(h) as Subsection (2Xi). 
The 1988 amendment by Laws 1988, Chap-
ter 248, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection 
(2Xa), rewrote the phrase before "except" 
which had read "the final orders and decrees of 
state and local agencies or appeals from the 
district court review of them"; deleted "not-
withstanding any other provision of law" at the 
end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted present Sub-
section (2Xb); designated former Subsections 
(2Kb) to (2Xh) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); and 
substituted "first degree or capital felony" for 
"first or capital degree felony" in present Sub-
section (2X0. 
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